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For decades, Nigeria’s refineries have been a symbol of the nation’s unfulfilled potential — vast facilities built to refine the country’s abundant crude oil into usable fuel but left to decay amid mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency. Now, in a dramatic turn that could redefine the country’s petroleum landscape, the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is considering selling them off entirely. The plan, according to insiders and top officials, is part of a sweeping economic reform aimed at attracting private investors, fostering genuine competition, and freeing the downstream oil sector from the grip of inefficiency that has strangled it for generations.
The four refineries — two in Port Harcourt, one in Warri, and one in Kaduna — have a combined installed refining capacity of 445,000 barrels per day. Yet for years, they have functioned more as costly relics than productive assets. Billions of dollars have been poured into turnaround maintenance projects that have yielded little or no results. Instead of refining crude oil to meet domestic demand, Nigeria has remained dependent on imports for refined petroleum products — a paradox that has made Africa’s largest oil producer one of the world’s biggest importers of petrol.
In an exclusive revelation that sent ripples through the global energy community, Olu Verheijen, the Special Adviser to President Tinubu on Energy, hinted during an interview with Bloomberg TV that the government is seriously considering the sale of the refineries. Speaking on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference (ADIPEC), Verheijen stated that the move is one of several strategic options being weighed to rejuvenate Nigeria’s energy sector. “It’s one of the options that you have to consider if you find the right technical partner with the right capital,” she said. Her tone was cautious but resolute, underscoring a new era of pragmatism in the corridors of power in Abuja.
The Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL), which owns and manages the refineries, has long been at the center of controversy. Originally established as a government corporation, it was transformed into a limited liability company in 2021 to encourage private participation and accountability. However, despite the structural reforms, inefficiencies persist. Most of the refineries remain idle, with negligible output even after years of expensive maintenance. Critics argue that the facilities have become conduits for wasteful government spending, while supporters insist they remain strategic national assets that should not be privatized.
Verheijen’s comments signal a radical shift in policy direction. For the Tinubu administration, the removal of fuel subsidies — one of its most controversial but economically significant reforms — has created a new opportunity to introduce competition and transparency. “The plants have largely been sustained by subsidies,” Verheijen explained. “But now that we’ve removed the subsidies, we’ve removed the distortions in that market.” The end of fuel subsidies, she emphasized, is meant to restore efficiency and create a more level playing field where market forces, not government interventions, determine outcomes.
The timing of this announcement is also significant. Nigeria’s energy sector is currently in flux. The Dangote Refinery, a privately owned 650,000 barrels-per-day mega project located in Lagos, has begun limited operations and is expected to dominate the domestic refining space once fully functional. The government’s apparent willingness to sell its refineries suggests a recognition that competing with private giants like Dangote’s plant would be futile without massive capital inflows and technical expertise — something the NNPCL has historically struggled to attract.
The decision to consider privatization also follows a frustrating period of inaction at the state refineries. The Port Harcourt refinery, for example, was shut down on May 24, 2025, for what officials described as a “30-day scheduled repair.” Yet more than 80 days later, no substantial progress has been recorded. Sources within the NNPCL have attributed the delay to bureaucratic bottlenecks, funding shortfalls, and a lack of clear leadership direction following the appointment of a new Group Chief Executive Officer. These setbacks have deepened public skepticism about the government’s ability to restore the refineries to functional status.
In a recent post on X (formerly Twitter), NNPCL CEO Bayo Ojulari sought to reassure Nigerians and international investors that efforts were underway to revive the plants. “We are looking ahead with optimism to ensure our refineries operate effectively,” he wrote. His statement was accompanied by an announcement that the company is actively seeking “technical equity partners” with the expertise and financial capacity to manage the refineries according to international standards. The move is in line with a broader push to reposition NNPCL as a commercially driven entity capable of competing globally.
But beyond the corporate rhetoric lies a deeper story about Nigeria’s struggle to wean itself off a culture of dependency and inefficiency. For decades, successive administrations have promised to fix the refineries, yet none have succeeded. The reasons are complex — ranging from entrenched corruption and political interference to the deliberate sabotage of reform efforts by vested interests who profit from fuel importation. The subsidy regime, while politically popular, became a massive drain on public resources, costing the country billions annually and enriching a small cabal of fuel importers.
Tinubu’s decision to eliminate subsidies was, therefore, both bold and risky. It instantly triggered fuel price hikes and public outrage, but economists widely agree it was a necessary step to stabilize the economy. By removing the subsidies, the administration effectively dismantled one of the key mechanisms that kept the refineries on artificial life support. Without the crutch of government funding, the refineries must now justify their existence on commercial grounds — and for now, they cannot.
In this context, the prospect of selling them appears not only logical but perhaps inevitable. Verheijen’s remarks underscore the administration’s resolve to pursue reforms based on “market efficiency and transparency,” ensuring that the petroleum sector operates purely on commercial terms. This marks a decisive break from the past, when political considerations and rent-seeking behavior dictated policy choices.
However, the road to privatization is fraught with challenges. The refineries’ assets are old, their equipment outdated, and their infrastructure severely dilapidated. Industry analysts say that any potential investor would have to commit billions of dollars to overhaul them. Moreover, questions about valuation, ownership structure, and potential job losses for thousands of workers loom large. The government would need to manage these concerns carefully to avoid political backlash or labor unrest.
There is also the issue of transparency. Past privatization exercises in Nigeria have often been marred by allegations of corruption and favoritism. To gain public trust, the Tinubu administration would need to ensure that the process is open, competitive, and fair. “If the sale is not handled transparently, it will only reinforce the perception that government assets are being sold to cronies,” warns Dr. Sam Amadi, a public policy expert and former chairman of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission.
Yet, proponents of the sale argue that privatization could be the only way to rescue the refineries from decades of neglect. They point to the success of the telecom sector, which was transformed after the government liberalized it in the early 2000s. By introducing private capital and competition, Nigeria went from having fewer than 500,000 telephone lines to over 200 million mobile subscribers today. The same model, they argue, could unleash similar growth in the downstream oil sector — reducing fuel import dependency, creating jobs, and boosting domestic production.
The administration’s long-term plan also includes floating NNPCL on the stock exchange through an initial public offering (IPO) — a move Verheijen described as “an end destination.” She explained that the goal is to create a company that is not only profitable but also accountable to shareholders. “What’s really important to the shareholders is that we have an NNPC that’s a lot more transparent, a lot more efficient, and delivers,” she said.
This vision aligns with Tinubu’s broader economic agenda, which seeks to attract foreign investment and rebuild confidence in Nigeria’s battered economy. Since assuming office, the president has pursued an aggressive reform strategy: removing subsidies, unifying the exchange rate, and liberalizing key sectors. These measures have been praised by international financial institutions, though they have also triggered short-term economic pain for ordinary Nigerians.
If successful, the sale of the refineries could mark a turning point in Nigeria’s economic history. It would signal a definitive shift from state control to private-led growth — a model that many developing nations have embraced with varying degrees of success. But if mishandled, it could deepen public distrust, fuel accusations of cronyism, and further alienate citizens already burdened by inflation and high living costs.
At its core, the debate over the refineries is about more than economics. It is about national identity, sovereignty, and the promise of self-reliance. For many Nigerians, the refineries are not just industrial plants — they are symbols of what the country once aspired to be: a self-sufficient oil-producing giant capable of refining its own fuel and exporting surplus to the world. Selling them off, some argue, would be tantamount to surrendering that dream.
Still, pragmatism may win out over sentiment. The stark reality is that Nigeria cannot afford to keep pouring money into facilities that no longer work. The government’s fiscal space is shrinking, debt levels are rising, and the need for foreign investment has never been greater. In such a scenario, selling the refineries — provided it is done transparently and strategically — might be the most practical way forward.
As the Tinubu administration weighs its options, one thing is clear: Nigeria stands at a crossroads. The decision to sell or retain the refineries will not only shape the future of its oil industry but also determine whether the country can finally break free from the cycle of waste and inefficiency that has plagued it for decades.
For now, the refineries remain quiet — their chimneys cold, their machinery still. But behind the silence, negotiations are likely intensifying. Technical partners, investment bankers, and policy advisers are watching closely, waiting for the government’s next move. Whether this marks the beginning of a new chapter in Nigeria’s oil history or just another unfulfilled promise will depend on what happens next in Abuja’s power corridors.
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